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Populism and Latin America, especially Argentina, are very good friends. Since the Great 
Depression, a shock from which the country has been unable to recover, Argentina is a 
classic example of Populism. Her economic decline for the last eighty years attests in this 
sense. As Populism is a hybrid of interventionist policies that go away and come again 
according to circumstances, in the long run, this non-system is possibly more harmful than 
Socialism. Public opinion becomes too baffled to find Populism guilty of economic failure. 
My question is this: How do we set a limit to Populist economic policies? International 
experience suggests that denationalization of key economic fields may prove a durable limit 
to Populism. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss a) the origins and consequences of 
Argentine  Populism,  b)  a  program  for  denationalization,  c)  the  ideas  of  an  Argentine 
forerunner of denationalization, d) denationalization as an experiment in human design, e) 
the need of non-reversible policies or the economic logic of denationalization, and f) the 
role of education in moving from Populism to a long-lasting market order. I will conclude, 
in the final paragraph, that the role of education as a change factor is unclear. 
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I. Argentine Populism: Ways and Results 
 
Though the Argentine economic decline has become a classic reference, let me make just a 
few remarks to add perspective. A century ago, the economic organization of this country 
was one of the most liberal and efficient in the World. Argentine prosperity was founded on 
three pillars: openness to trade, gold standard, and fiscal federalism (Ávila 2011, II, 37-45). 
Exports were a large fraction of GDP, mortgage loans were half the GDP, and Provinces 
collected almost all their revenues by themselves. British railway capitalists demanded no 
risk premium for the huge investments they were sinking in the country, and per-capita 
income  was  the  same  as  the  Anglo-Saxon  average  (USA,  Great  Britain,  Australia,  and 
Canada). 
In 1930, international circumstances forced Argentina to abandon the Anglo-Argentine 
Treaty for Amity, Trade and Navigation that was the legal foundation of Anglo-Argentine 
trade and investment for more than a century (Ferns 1966). We think the Great Depression 
was the triggering factor of a regime change that led the country to commercial autarky and 
political isolation. In a few years, Argentina lost her historic bond to Britain, a superpower 
at that time, and found herself pushed to the outdoors. 
Around 1935 the country’s economic organization changed dramatically. In the coming 
decades Argentina would become a very closed economy (only more open than Brazil and 
Iran), experience a classic hyperinflation, several banking panics and two defaults on her 
debt with the resulting highest country-risk premium of the World for a thirty-years period 
(ten percentage points per annum on average); at the same time, the country would convert 
into a unitary state from the fiscal standpoint. In the last years, Argentine per-capita income 
has fallen to forty per cent of the Anglo-Saxon average (Ávila 2012, II). 
Populism has reached its maximum possibilities in present day Argentina. There is no 
real limit to currency devaluation, beyond the political cost of uncontrolled inflation (bank 
runs are unlikely because banks are not trustworthy and deposits are pretty low); there is no 
real limit to trade interference, in spite of Mercosur, and there is no limit either to the power 
of the President over provincial governors due to political management of federal funds. 
Populism  generally  involves  tinkering  with  property  rights,  through  nationalization 
when property is given up with or without proper compensation, or through policies leading   3
to sizable changes in the market value of affected property. Argentina has undergone both 
types of violation of private property. There is no difference between them as to their long-
run impact upon capital accumulation and growth. Recent examples of the first kind are the 
nationalizations of pension funds and water utilities; recent examples of the second kind are 
very frequent currency devaluations, freezing tariffs of public utilities, banning of meat and 
wheat exports, and so on. 
 
II. Denationalization in Practice 
 
An economic organization founded on protectionism, central banking and fiscal centralism, 
all leading to nationalism and international isolation, should be considered one of the basic 
causes of Argentine Populism over the last eighty years. This kind of organization is prone 
to Populism due to its intrinsic unaccountability and reversibility. In this setting, Presidents 
tend  to  deal  not  with  Congress,  powerful  governors  and  foreign  powers  but  with  local 
interest  groups,  provincial  beggars  and  peripheral  countries.  An  organization  like  this 
entails a low cost of repudiation of the rules governing the economy. In turn, a low cost of 
repudiation entails a high probability of reversion of economic rules and consequently a 
high country risk premium. Through this process, Populism ends up hindering investment, 
productivity, and growth, apart from federalism and basic civil liberties. 
The Argentine case is a good example of path dependence. The Great Depression meant 
two things for the country: the demise of the Anglo-Argentine Treaty and the loss of key 
export markets. The consequences of these facts were political isolation and protectionism. 
In a few years, international trends and political isolation led to foreign exchange controls, 
central banking, and nationalization of tax collection. In this way, a regime characterized by 
unaccountability and reversibility was born. Migué (1993, 59) pointed out in this sense that 
“broad  historical  trends…  are  consistent  with  the  thesis  that  spending  and  regulatory 
instruments can be more easily employed on a large scale when trade barriers are steep.” 
A proposal to establish a limit to Populism consists of taking away from the jurisdiction 
of the national government the key fields of international trade, money and banking, and 
tax collection. Regarding trade, denationalization means to place foreign trade under the 
jurisdiction of a free trade agreement with a superpower. For instance, an FTA with the   4
USA would force the Argentine government to comply with a definite tariff structure and 
common rules regarding intellectual property, protection of investments, official supplies, 
the environment and the labor market. Thus, to denationalize in this field is equal to supra-
nationalize. 
Regarding money, denationalization means to substitute a world reserve currency for 
the national currency. Regarding banking, it means to place local commercial banks under 
the same jurisdiction as foreign resident banks.
2 To denationalize in this field is equal to 
internationalize.
3 
Regarding public finance, denationalization means to decentralize the collection of tax 
revenues. This involves making provinces accountable for collecting most revenues so that 
political power is effectively divided. To denationalize in this field is equal to provincialize. 
The only purpose of denationalizing foreign trade, money and banking is to make sure 
that key areas of the economy remain safe from the discretion of the Argentine jurisdiction. 
The really high cost of repudiation of supranational and international agreements should 
discourage interventions of the national government in those areas. In this way, the country 
-risk premium should go down and capital accumulation within national borders should go 
up. 
The goal of denationalizing tax collection is to restrict the power of central government. 
Think that 24 small Populist governors should be less harmful than a domineering Populist 
President. Tax competition among provinces should lead to lower taxes, better spending, 
and more effective democracy.
4 We must warn nevertheless that the reversion cost of tax 
decentralization is low. Why? Because the recreation of a centralized system by a future 
government won’t involve a repudiation of international agreements, that could stigmatize 
and isolate the country. 
                                                 
2 Central banks of foreign commercial banks become the lenders of last resort of local banks, and local banks 
comply with the regulations established by foreign surveillance authorities. 
3 Benegas Lynch Jr. pointed me out that the fundamental benefit of the existence of nations and frontiers is to 
decentralize power. I agree. Let me add that supra-nationalization and inter-nationalization entail transferring 
jurisdiction from the government of the Populist country to many supra-national treaties and many bodies of 
surveillance. 
4 North and Weingast (1989) have argued that “de facto federalism” was behind the vast expansion of British 
enterprise in the 18
th century. “The fragmentation of power between the king and the Parliament effectively 
prevented the national government from imposing taxes and regulations on commercial enterprises and (…) 
such governmental activity occurred instead at local levels. Not only did the localities impose most taxes and 
regulations, but they were actively engaged in competition with one another for commercial advantage; as a 
result, taxes and regulation remained relatively light.”   5
 
III. Alberdi and the Cost of Repudiation 
 
My thesis is not new. Friedrich Hayek (1978) wrote a proposal for denationalizing money, 
which I have enjoyed reading though it does not fit altogether in the Argentine history of 
institutional reversibility. Juan Baustista Alberdi (1854), the 19
th century Argentine social 
thinker, wrote perceptively on the stabilizing influence on domestic institutions of treaties 
with superpowers (Britain, France, and the US at his time): 
 
“We must sign treaties to surround with equal immunity every ship, every railway, canal, 
wharf, factory, where waves the flag of the friend nation to which belongs the one who 
exploits those industries, making use of the civil right consecrated by the Constitution. (…) 
This will be the only way to preserve them from the dangers of the unending civil war; that 
is, to attract them from abroad, to fix them to the country, and to get a fall in the interest 
rate by way of reducing the risks that make it soar.” 
 
Our “shining city in the hill” would take the form of a confederation of small provincial 
republics, active player in world trade and investment thanks to treaties with superpowers, 
with a currency and banking system imported from the “islands of stability” of the World. 
Would Alberdi have approved of this picture? There is evidence that he would have done 
so regarding the trade side of the picture. On the money and banking side, though he didn’t 
write down any specific preference, we think that after learning about a system that led to 
hyperinflation and repeated banking restrictions, he would have shared our view on this 
matter. Now, on the fiscal side of the picture Alberdi did have a specific preference. Since 
the challenge at the time he wrote was to create a central government, he preferred to build 
a strong federation. Nevertheless, after 150 years of growing concentration of political and 
financial power in the hands of the central government, we think that he would have revised 
his view on this matter. Better than most Argentine thinkers, Alberdi knew that for a city to 
shine the Leviathan has to be restrained. 
   6
IV. Non-Reversible Policies 
 
A good policy is a necessary condition for capital accumulation. The sufficient condition is 
a good and non-reversible policy. Regarding trade reform, the successful British (1846) and 
Chilean (1973-2003) unilateral openings are the exceptions that prove the rule, while the 
successful forced Japanese opening (1950s), the successful supra-national Spanish opening 
(from the 1970s on), the successful bilateral Mexican opening (from the 1990s on), and the 
successful  bilateral  Argentine  opening  (1862-1930)  are  the  rule  itself  (Ávila  2011,  II). 
Rodrik (2000) stresses that a trade reform often involves importation of institutions from 
abroad, adding that “perhaps the major NAFTA contribution to the Mexican economy was 
the  factor  of  irreversibility  and  locking  in  of  the  economic  reform  that  the  agreement 
provided.” 
Reversibility, repudiation cost and country-risk point to the same idea. Because of its 
low expectations of reversibility we think that a supra-national trade opening is superior to 
a unilateral one from the economic point of view. When investors perceive a low degree of 
reversibility, the process of resource reallocation, from the import-substituting sector to the 
export sector, speeds up and foreign investment jumps. 
The same argument makes advisable the denationalization of money and banking in the 
unstable and Populist country. For Argentina a floating exchange rate policy is a dangerous 
thing and convertibility of the local currency is doomed to reversion. What is left, then? 
Dollarization should be the appropriate policy. It is nevertheless rejected by every politician 
I know even when Argentina is the fourth most dollarized country after Bolivia, Nicaragua 
and Russia, which also underwent hyperinflation, bank runs, civil unrest or civil war (Feige 
2003, Feige et al 2000, 2002). Euroization may be an attractive option for an anti-American 
country like Argentina. 
Five banking panics in the last thirty years, the low level of deposits in resident banks 
and the sizable deposits of Argentine residents in Uruguayan and American banks attest to 
the suitability of an offshore banking system. Not only to foster savings but also to recreate 
long-term credit to resident families and firms. 
   7
V. Is Denationalization an Experiment in Human Design? 
 
According to Hayek (1988, 7, 76-77) the “spontaneous extended human order created 
by a competitive market” is more efficient in creating wealth and preserving civil liberties 
than the “deliberated arrangement of human interaction by a central authority.” Hayek calls 
the latter human design. Yet in the last thirty years we have witnessed a portentous exercise 
in human design: Spain has become a member of the European Union. Spain and the rest of 
the EU have free trade in goods and services, free mobility of labor and capital resources, a 
common currency, and, I’ll dare to say, even a common banking system. The Spanish risk 
premium has thus fallen sharply, triggering the Spanish economic miracle. 
The EU has denationalized trade, money and banking, while preserving a decentralized 
collection of taxes. Let’s focus on the challenging replacement of the Spanish peseta for the 
euro, the common currency whose rate of expansion is controlled by the European Central 
Bank. Hayek (1978, VIII to XV) opposed the creation of a common currency, suggesting 
instead the development of a competitive, transnational, private money and banking system. 
What monetary and banking arrangement is better for the Populist and unstable country? 
Hayek (ibid, 96) discarded his own proposal for the case of a Populist country: 
 
“Many countries would probably try, by subsidies or similar measures, to preserve a locally 
established bank issuing a distinct national currency that would be available side by side 
with the international currencies, (…) There would then be some danger that the nationalist 
and socialist forces active in a silly agitation against multinational corporations would lead 
governments, by advantages conceded to the national institution, to bring about a gradual 
return to the present system of privileged national issuers of currency.” 
 
The Hayek system has but a small chance to settle down in a Populist country, because 
that system is fundamentally reversible. That’s why we prefer to import money and banking 
institutions from abroad. Being the Hayek system the outgrowth of a competitive process of 
discovery, it should be more efficient than the denationalization of money and banking. Yet 
the latter appears to be more stable. The general argument of Hayek is valid for Socialism.   8
Not much for Populism. This non-system wouldn’t allow competition the time needed for 
the discovery process to produce its fruits. 
 
VI. How do We Get from Populism to a Lasting Market Order? 
 
The traditional answer to this important question is education. Plain observation led me not 
to believe in the power of education as a source of economic growth. I think education is a 
consequence, not a cause, of growth. Douglass North (1993, 1994) wrote two revealing 
passages on this question. The first one says that education is not a sufficient condition for 
growth and highlights the need for efficient institutions. 
 
“Richard  Easterlin’s  presidential  address  to  the  Economic  History  Association  in  1980 
reflected the widespread optimism that education was the solution for economic growth. 
But while investment in education may be a necessary condition, it is clearly insufficient, as 
the recent evidence from third world countries and particularly Eastern Europe economies 
will  attest.  Easterlin’s  own  data  (and  his  discussion)  point  to  poor  countries  such  as 
Rumania and the Philippines that had long histories of educational investment above the 
threshold level that he thought would make a difference but did not result in sustained 
growth; the former Soviet Union had both high levels of formal education and a skilled 
labor  force.  Equally  important  are  the  incentives  which  lead  economic  and  political 
organizations to invest in productive institutions.” 
 
The second passage says that economic decline not necessarily induces perceptions leading 
to appropriate reforms in the ruling classes of the affected country. 
 
“But it is a fact of history; one of the most enduring and significant lessons to be derived 
from the past. It is not that economies in the past have not been aware of their inferior or 
declining  competitive  positions.  They  have.  But  perceptions  about  the  reasons  are 
something  else  again.  Spain’s  long  decline  in  the  seventeenth  century  from  the  most 
powerful nation in the western world since the Roman empire to a second rate power was a 
consequence of recurrent war and fiscal crises. The policies that were considered feasible in   9
the context of the institutional constraints and perceptions of the actors were price controls, 
tax increases and repeated confiscations. As for the perceptions of the actors here is Jan De 
Vries description of the efforts to reverse the decline: ‘But it was not a society unaware of 
what was happening. A whole school of economic reformers… wrote mountains of tracts 
pleading for new measures… Indeed in 1623 a Junta de Reformación recommended to the 
new king, Philip IV, a series of measures including taxes to encourage early marriage (and 
hence population growth), limitations on the number of servants, the establishment of a 
bank, prohibitions on the import of luxuries, the closing of brothels, and the prohibition of 
the teaching of Latin in small towns (to reduce the flight from agriculture of peasants who 
had acquired a smattering of education)…’ As the foregoing quotation makes clear there is 
no guarantee that economic decline will induce perceptions on the part of the actors that 
will lead to reversal of that decline, improving performance.” 
 
We know that education increases individual productivity and the standard of living within 
an efficient institutional setting. Yet for the Populist country the key question is whether or 
not education influences perceptions in a way conducive to a long-lasting market order. 
North’s observation on Rumania and the Philippines and the absurd policy suggestions of 
the educated members of the seventeenth-century Spanish think tank, raise serious doubts 
on the usefulness of education to identify the causes of national economic failure. 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
 
We have provided an answer to the question posed at the beginning: yes, we can establish a 
limit to Populism through denationalization of key economic fields. We have also advanced 
possible ways to achieve this goal: tax decentralization, which brings the citizen closer to 
government decisions and heightens political competition; supranational trade agreements, 
which make local industry face foreign competition in a way perceived as irreversible by 
entrepreneurs and investors, and the importation of money and banking institutions in view 
of its relative stability. 
As far as I know, there exist three ways to move a Populist country to a long-lasting 
market order. First, most reformers are strong believers in the potential of education. They   10
think that educated people will make better choices on the economic organization of the 
country. We think this is a daring hypothesis. Second, following specially North (1996, 10-
11), most economists think that the economic reform might be the outcome of a revolution; 
that’s to say, the result of a conflict between organizations with different interests over the 
existing institutional framework. Some Argentine economists and historians argue that this 
hypothesis was proved right for this country in the 19
th century. It didn’t work, however, in 
the 20
th century. Populism has been able to thrive in the last eighty years mainly because of 
the dispersion of the export sector’s political power and also because of ‘path dependence.’
5 
Last but not least, we’ve got a default hypothesis: the way of the World. It says, in short, 
that Argentina is the problem and the World is the solution. In this final case, the reform 
would take on the shape of international and supranational agreements, reflecting a mix of 
World and regional pressures and opportunities. 
                                                 
5 The country’s terms of trade (or the incentives for the exporting sector to lobby for trade liberalization) have 
not been really high during this period. For this reason, we shouldn’t dismiss the possibility that many years 
of high terms of trade may prompt the kind of conflict that eventually would lead to economic reform.   11
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